• U.S. Training Center’s personal protective services have been effective in ensuring the safety of chief of mission personnel in Afghanistan’s volatile and ever-changing security environment. No one under U.S. Training Center’s protection has been injured or killed, and there have been no incidents involving the use of deadly force.
• The Bureau of Diplomatic Security generally manages the U.S. Training Center contract well. However, with an increased number of personal protective service operations in Afghanistan, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security may require a dedicated Contracting Officer’s Representative to provide proper oversight of activities. Additionally, neither of the two current Assistant Regional Security Officers who act as the Contracting Offi cer’s Representatives, verify the accuracy of personnel rosters (muster sheets) before they are submitted for invoicing to ensure that the contractor’s labor charges are accurate.
• U.S. Training Center’s personal security specialists are experienced and are trained in-country through an adequate continuing professional education program focused on a number of appropriate topics. However, OIG noted that U.S. Training Center personnel lacked a specific type of security training unique to operating in Afghanistan’s environment. This defi ciency surfaced during the review and OIG detailed its findings to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and U.S. Training Center. For security reasons, and as requested by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, details have been omitted from this report but will be provided to the bureau under separate cover. In addition, personal security specialists received Iraq cultural awareness training, rather than training for Afghanistan.
• U.S. Training Center has instituted reliable controls for its inventory of government-furnished equipment, including weapons, radios, and tracking equipment. Physical security procedures are in place to effectively protect all of this equipment.
• There are several weaknesses in U.S. Training Center’s explosive testing program for canines. U.S. Training Center does not test canines for all scents required by its contract with the Department of State. In addition, old materials are used to train and test the canines, although fresh materials are required. Finally, the way in which these materials are stored may lead to cross-contamination.
• Embassy Kabul has had issues with the aluminum rims on fully armored vehicles used by U.S. Training Center for protection missions. U.S. Training Center personnel noted that the tires on the armored vehicles in Afghanistan frequently blow out, and substituting steel rims may lead to fewer flat tires.
• U.S. Training Center’s personal protective services are adjusting to the changing environment of Afghanistan. For example, the number of U.S. Training Center personnel is increasing to accommodate more personal protection missions. However, proposals for increases have not been based on needs analyses performed by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and may include misallocations of resources. Embassy Kabul is also seeking to integrate Afghan nationals into personal protective services.
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